

**Facets of Internationalism and Isolationism:
An Analysis of the Structure of Policy Alternatives**

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In the post-Cold War era, Americans have been called upon to make a variety of international commitments, ranging from humanitarian assistance to Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to military assistance in Kuwait and Haiti. Yet, as many researchers and political officials have discovered, there does not appear to be a clear consensus in the American mass public that favors such an expansive role for the United States overseas. Just as troubling, there is also a lack of consensus *against* American involvement in world politics. The lack of a clear-cut direction in American foreign policy attitudes has led many researchers to conclude that most Americans are too ill-informed about world affairs to have preferences that are stable, coherent, and consistent (c.f. Lippmann 1922; Bailey 1948; Kennan 1957; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Almond 1960; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Rosenau 1961; Monroe 1975; Converse and Markus 1979; Kinder 1983; Morgenthau 1985; Bennett 1994; Gaubatz 1995).

But, public opinion is not created in a vacuum. If there is instability and incoherence in individuals' attitudes about foreign affairs, we need to recognize that this emanates from two sources: individual predispositions and the political context in which issues are presented. No study of public opinion on foreign policy can be complete without addressing both of these aspects. To date, most of the research in public opinion has focused solely on the sources and structure of individual-level attitudes on foreign policy issues. Very little research has focused on societal preferences and issue framing. The problem is, while attitudes occur on an individual level, public preferences occur on a societal level. Research strategies designed to measure the former may reveal very little about the latter.

**APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN MASS PREFERENCES ON INTERNATIONAL
INVOLVEMENT**

First, it is important to note that although the measurement of foreign policy attitudes is often complicated by problems of question wording and measurement error stemming from factors such as low levels of political information and a changing international environment, several studies in recent years have found elements of discernible, even rational structuring in foreign policy opinion (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989; Page and Shapiro 1991; Nincic 1992; Sulfaro 1996). Generally, moving from an individual level of analysis to an aggregate, or societal level, tends to magnify the amount of structure observed at the individual level. Therefore, if there is structure in individual attitudes, then we should find rational policy preferences at the societal level as well. Given this, Gaubatz's (1995) recent claim that mass preferences on foreign policy are intransitive, or lacking in consistency, doesn't make much sense. If there is structure in individual attitudes, then societal

preferences should be *more* structured. In order to evaluate Gaubatz's conclusions, we need to examine the problems with his assumptions as well as problems with his measurement model.

The Existence of Multiple Attitudes

I contend that the tendency of researchers to view policy alternatives as polarized dichotomies may be, in part, responsible for the apparent inconsistency in the public's preferences regarding international involvement. Specifically, researchers tend to view each foreign policy scenario, whether it be involvement in the Middle East, peacekeeping in Bosnia, or defense spending as either "isolationist" or "internationalist" in nature. To be consistent, a respondent must exhibit "isolationist" opinions for each scenario, or they must be pro-involvement in every case. When the nature of the responses is mixed, researchers claim that public opinion is unstable, or that preferences are intransitive (Almond 1960; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Gaubatz 1995).

The problem is, each scenario is different, and therefore it makes sense that each should evoke a somewhat different reaction from respondents. In fact, it is not really the scenario that we should be interested in, but, rather, the set of considerations leading to the judgment. Involvement in Bosnia may be perceived as more risky than involvement in Kuwait. Or, depending on how the question is phrased, Americans may be more supportive for involvement framed in the context of humanitarian goals than they are of involvement framed in strategic terms. This is not necessarily suggestive of instability or intransitivity. Rather, it suggests that Americans may view the question of international involvement in ways more complex than the simple favor/don't favor dichotomy would suggest.

Zaller (1992) suggests that for most political issues, citizens have multiple attitudes. In other words, when asked a question about whether the United States should step up military involvement in Bosnia, many considerations may be activated. An individual may hold a general set of beliefs about whether the United States should be involved in the affairs of other nations, but they may also hold beliefs about whether the U.S. should come to the defense of citizens struggling to form their own political system, beliefs about such things as the importance of cooperating with the United Nations, and beliefs about combating the influence of communism in Europe or elsewhere. The response an individual gives to a survey question addressing their preferences on U.S. involvement will depend on how that individual has been "primed."

Priming is simply the cueing of a decision making heuristic, or the creation of a context in which the question is to be evaluated. Citizens may be primed by things like the ordering of the questions in a survey. They are also affected by the salience of the event in political discourse, and the nature of the political dialogue surrounding the event. Rather than treating these as sources of measurement error, which create attitude inconsistency, we can view them as sources of mass preferences. Indeed, to answer the question "does the mass public have a structured set of foreign policy preferences?" it is necessary to analyze the manner in which issues are framed.

The Political Context of Public Opinion

All issues exist within a political context. Rather than simply treat isolationism and internationalism as policy options existing at opposite ends of the political continuum, this analysis seems to explain the continuum itself in order to determine the structure of the public's policy preferences. Knowing how issues are arrayed will reveal the manner in which they are framed, and subsequently evaluated, by the mass public. Only then will be able to determine if mass policy preferences are organized in a coherent fashion.

While a variety of scholars have examined the structure of mass attitudes on issues of internationalism and isolationism, few have attempted to measure the structure of the issues themselves (c.f. Almond 1960; Hero 1969; Bennett 1974; Bardes and Oldendick 1978, 1983; Holsti 1979; Free and Watts 1980; Holsti and Rosenau 1984, 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Chittick and Billingsley 1989; Russett 1989; Wittkopf 1990). Indeed, many academic researchers and members of the polling community have made broad claims about the foreign policy orientation of Americans on the basis of responses to one or two survey items. Such approaches fail to take into account the manner in which these survey items are *perceived*. The only way to examine mass perceptions is to measure how issues are evaluated relative to each other. We may find, for instance, that for some foreign policy issues, the pro-isolationist position and the pro-internationalist position are fairly close to each other. For others, there may be a greater degree of issue polarization.

As Jacoby (1990) has shown, if we examine mass responses on policy issue questions, the responses can be construed as a set of competing policy alternatives mapped onto an ideological continuum. In this analysis, I will examine a series of foreign policy issues taken from the CPS National Election Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations surveys. For each item, I will create a set of dichotomous policy alternatives and map the cutting points in a dimensional space using a non-parametric cumulative scaling technique developed by Mokken (1971). The purpose is to analyze the issue alternatives relative to each other, rather than to explain the underlying causes of mass attitudes, *per se*. This will reveal something about the structure of mass preferences, and the degree of “internationalism” associated with various policy proposals. The assumption guiding this strategy is that not all policies are weighted equally. Some levels of commitment to U.S. involvement overseas may be fairly common, even among individuals who are not supportive of more risky endeavors. At other levels of commitment, we may find individuals dedicated to a variety of risky and non-risky involvement scenarios.

DATA AND MEASURES

The data for this analysis come from the 1990 and 1994 American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy surveys, conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. All variables having to do with U.S. policies toward another nation or the international system were used. All items were coded as dichotomies, where higher numbers corresponded to greater support for internationalist policies and goals.

The variable names and descriptions are listed below. In many cases, variables used in 1990 were also available in 1994. In other cases, due to changes in the international environment, items present in the 1990 survey were absent in 1994. However, the missing items were generally replaced in 1994 with items that tapped the same basic sentiment in a more current political context.

General forms of assistance

- *economic aid*– support for economic aid for the purposes of economic development and technical assistance (1990 and 1994)
- *military aid*– supplying military aid to other countries, where military aid is defined as arms and equipment but not troops (1990 and 1994)
- *military sales*– desirability of the government selling military equipment to other nations (1990 and 1994)

General support for involvement

- *active role*– respondents were asked if it was best for the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs (1990 and 1994)
- *peacekeeping*–support for the U.S. taking part in a United Nations international peacekeeping force (1994)
- *CIA*– should the CIA work secretly inside other countries to try to weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly to the U.S. (1990 and 1994)

Support for specific involvement scenarios

- *Kuwait*– approval of the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion (1990)
- *Haiti*–approval of the U.S. response (1994)
- *Panama*– approval of the U.S. intervention (1990)
- *China*– approval of the U.S. response to the Chinese government’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators (1990)
- *Kuwait2*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait (1990)
- *Philippines*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if the government of the Philippines was threatened by a revolution or a civil war (1990)
- *Mexico*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if the government of Mexico was threatened by a revolution or a civil war (1990)
- *Eastern Europe*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if the Soviet Union tried to overthrow a democratic government in Eastern Europe (1990)
- *South Africa*–support for the use of U.S. troops if civil war broke out in South Africa (1994)
- *Ukraine*–support for the use of U.S. troops in Ukraine in the event of an invasion by Russia (1994)
- *Poland*–support for the use of U.S. troops if Russia invaded Poland (1994)
- *Western Europe*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe (1990 and 1994)
- *Israel*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if Arab forces invaded Israel (1990 and 1994)
- *Saudi Arabia*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia (1990 and 1994)
- *El Salvador*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if the government of El Salvador was about to be defeated by leftist rebels (1990)
- *South Korea*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea (1990 and 1994)
- *Japan*– approval of the use of U.S. troops if Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union (1990)
- *Israel2*– should the U.S apply no pressure or diplomatic pressure only on Israel to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians, or should we reduce or cut off economic and military aid if Israel refuses to negotiate (1990)
- *drugs*– favor the use of U.S. military forces to intervene in other countries if their governments will not cooperate with our attempts to control the illegal drug flow into the U.S. (1990)

Support for general defense commitments

- *defense spending*– whether we should expand/keep about the same our spending on national defense, or cut back (1990 and 1994)
- *NATO*– should we increase/maintain our commitment to NATO or decrease/pull out of NATO (1990 and 1994)
- *NATO expansion*–whether NATO should be expanded to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, thereby committing the U.S. to defend them against attack in the same way as we are committed to defending Western Europe (1994)

Support for diplomatic relations

- *Cuba*– favor re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations and exchanging ambassadors with Cuba (1990 and 1994)¹
- *Vietnam*– should we restore normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam (1990 and 1994)
- *North Korea*–support for establishing normal diplomatic relations with North Korea (1994)
- *Iran*–support for establishing normal diplomatic relations with Iran (1994)

Support for free trade

- *NAFTA*– support for a free trade agreement with Mexico (1990 and 1994)
- *tariffs*–belief that the reduction of tariffs and restrictions on imported goods would decrease the cost of goods for everyone, as opposed to the claim that tariffs and restrictions are necessary to protect manufacturing jobs and certain industries (1994)

SCALING POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Our objective in this analysis is to determine the structure of policy preferences in the mass public. Specifically, we want to uncover a continuum in which policy options are arrayed, with those policies having the greatest amount of support at one end of the continuum, and policies having the lowest amount of public support at the opposite end. Further, we want the items in the continuum to exhibit the property of transitivity with respect to each other.

While many researchers have claimed to accomplish this objective in studying foreign policy attitudes, few have used the techniques which actually permit such conclusions. Techniques such as factor analysis only analyze the pattern of covariance among individual attitudes (Bardes and Oldendick 1978, 1983; Chittick and Billingsley 1989; Wittkopf 1990).

Other researchers create typologies for different levels and types of support for internationalism that they believe exist in the mass public (Holsti 1979; Free and Watts 1980; Holsti and Rosenau 1984, 1988; Hinkley 1988; Wittkopf 1990; Gaubatz 1995). The categories of the typology are then compared to a host of survey questions in order to establish patterns of mass preferences. The problem is, there is rarely a monotonic relationship between the category types and the policy issues. For example, we don't find systematic patterns of increasing support for internationalist policies among hard-core internationalist categories; we merely find that the pro-involvement position is the modal preference. Such techniques fall short of revealing the underlying structure of mass preferences on foreign affairs. They tell us more

¹The 1994 version of the question addressed only diplomatic, and not economic, relations.

about the researcher's thoughts on the variants of isolationist and internationalist sentiment in the mass public than they reveal ordered, structured dimensions of public preferences. If we are interested in the latter, we must select research techniques that are appropriate for this objective.

A Cumulative Scaling Model

Because the scenarios under which individuals may support or fail to support internationalist involvement differ in terms of their level of commitment, type of commitment, and risk to the United States, it makes sense to view each choice as a separate preference, rather than to view different choices as multiple indicators of the same preference. For low risk scenarios, the decision to support an internationalist position may be an easy one. We should expect large numbers of Americans to be willing to make such "easy" commitments. Other policy options may be more expensive, entail more risk, or involve a type of commitment that is greater in scope. These policies may be more difficult to support. We should therefore expect fewer Americans to support these types of commitments. Most likely, the segment of the population willing to support the most difficult of policies would be those with the most extreme commitment to a globalist foreign policy.

Moreover, we should expect individuals who support the most difficult types of international commitments to also be willing to support the easier ones. Other individuals may support only easy commitments, or may prefer no commitments at all. The most appropriate way to measure support for various forms of internationalism, given these assumptions, is a cumulative scaling model. All forms of the cumulative scaling model share some basic characteristics. First, they tend to be unidimensional in approach. That is, they seek to scale items along a single dimension, or continuum. Items are evaluated in terms of their frequency distributions. The order of an item in the scale depends on the proportion of respondents who respond favorably to the item. These models are often nonparametric as well. That is, they do not require that we know the error distribution in the population to estimate the population parameters. As long as we meet the rather stringent requirements of the model itself, we can make inferences about the population.

For this analysis, the Mokken scaling technique is preferred to the traditional Guttman scale. The two approaches are very similar, but the Guttman technique is deterministic, while the Mokken technique is probabilistic. That is, the Guttman technique makes no allowances for sampling error or measurement error; it contains no theory of scaling errors. As a consequence, the measure of goodness-of-fit used in Guttman scaling has questionable validity. With a randomly generated response pattern, Guttman's coefficient of reproducibility has taken on values as high as .90 (Mokken 1971). When we have a large pool of respondents, a non-experimental setting, and a large pool of items to be tested, the Mokken approach is better suited to scale development.

Construction of the Scale

In order to construct a Mokken scale from a set of items, there must first be a positive correlation among all of the elements of the potential scale. In this case, all items exhibited positive correlations with each other, and none had to be dropped from the analysis.

The next step is to array the items according to their cutting points. A cutting point is simply the division between response categories. For example, for the item on economic aid, the cutting point is located between .499 and .501, where the sample is divided into those who favor aid and those who don't.

.499 / .501
 (49.9%) (50.1%)

The cutting point “cuts” the sample into two groups for that item: those who favor the policy option, and those who don’t. Those who don’t favor the option will always be located to the left of the cutting point. Those who favor the option will be located to the right of the cutting point.

We then map the cutting points for each item along the same continuum. In the end, we should have item cutting points for “easy” policies located closer to the left of the scale, and item cutting points for the more difficult policies located closer to the right of the scale. If we were to place respondents on this scale, those located at the left end of the continuum would be those who supported internationalist policies only in a few, low-risk circumstances. Extreme internationalists would be located farther to the right end of the continuum.

Goodness-of-fit. The next step is to determine which items should be retained in the scale, and which should be discarded due to a poor fit. The Mokken approach assesses goodness-of-fit in two ways: by examining relationships between pairs of individual items, and by examining the combined relationship of all items in the scale.

To assess the goodness-of-fit for item pairs, we construct a series of crosstabulation tables to represent all possible bivariate relationships between items. We are interested in the off-diagonal cells. If there is a relationship between the two variables in the table, we generally do not expect to find many respondents in these cells. In particular, when constructing a cumulative scale, we are interested in the pattern of responses in only one of the off-diagonal cells—the error cell.² This cell is called the “error cell.” The error cell will be the combination of responses that is inconsistent, given our scaling model. Figure 1 shows the location of the error cell in this example.

		“Harder” item	
		Disagree/oppose	Agree/favor
“Easier” item	Disagree/oppose	XXX	Error cell
	Agree/favor	Not an error	XXX

Figure 1. Location of Error Cell in the Dichotomous Case

In this case, the cell in row 2, column 1, is not considered to be an error because it is consistent with the assumptions of the scaling model. For the easier item, the cutting point between oppose and favor will occur first (it will be located farther to the left on the scale). Thus, we can have some respondents who take a position of favor on the easier item, and yet oppose the harder item. For the harder item, the cutting point will be located farther to the right, or after the cutting point for the first item as been crossed. Thus, we should not find anyone who is beyond the cutting point for the harder item but has not yet passed the cutting point for the easier item. The observed frequency of the cell in row 1, column 2, is

²With polychotomous items, there may be several error cells.

the number of observed errors in the cell. These errors are then compared to the expected cell frequency, or the number of cases we expect to find if the null hypothesis of no relationship is true. These two values are used to calculate the goodness-of-fit, or H value, for the item pair. This is shown in Equation 1 below:

$$H_{item} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k f_{o_j}}{\sum_{j=1}^k f_{e_j}} \quad \text{with } j = 1 \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$

where $f_{o_{ij}}$ is the frequency observed in the error cell and $f_{e_{ij}}$ is the frequency expected to appear in the error cell under the null hypothesis.

Paired H values near or above .3 are considered desirable for constructing a Mokken scale. Items exhibiting a pattern of low pairwise H values should be dropped from the scale.

Among the items that remain, we begin to construct the scale. Mokken suggests a stepwise process, beginning with the items with the highest pairwise H values. When each new item is added to the scale, we calculate an H value for the entire scale, as shown in Equation 2:

$$H_{scale} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^k f_{o_{ij}}}{\sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^k f_{e_{ij}}} \quad (\text{Eq. 2})$$

We continue to add items until the scale H starts to decrease. Items that lower the overall goodness-of-fit should not be included in the scale.

Double monotonicity. An additional requirement of a Mokken scale is double monotonicity among the items. To determine whether this condition exists, we create a table where the items are arrayed along the rows and the columns in order of difficulty. The cell entries for each pair of items will be the probability of a positive response for both items, which is why the table is often referred to as a P-matrix.³ As we move from easy to hard issues, across the rows and columns, these probability values should not decrease (nor should they be tied). It is this property that ensures that preferences are transitive—that is, that as we move from harder to easier items in the scale, the probability of favoring the policy tends to increase. Items that violate this condition must be dropped from the scale regardless of their contribution to the overall goodness-of-fit value.

³The probabilities of positive responses is also called a P-positive matrix. When we have polychotomous items, we also need to look at the P-negative matrix, or the probability that both responses are negative, for each pair of items.

FINDINGS

One of the most important findings of this analysis is that mass preferences on many policies *are* transitive. Most likely, other researchers were unable to detect this because of the use of inappropriate measurement techniques. Only a cumulative scaling procedure can provide empirical evidence of transitivity in policy preferences.

In other respects, many of the conclusions reached by other researchers have been supported by the findings reported here, namely that many questions of internationalism bear no consistent relationship to each other, and that mass preferences may be multidimensional in nature.

Preference Structure and Issue Framing

Due to the stringent requirements of maximizing scale H values and double monotonicity, there were many items that had to be dropped from the analysis for one reason or another. Some items simply bore no relationship to the others, and in other cases, items were strongly related but violated double monotonicity. Among the items that were discarded, several additional unidimensional scales were constructed (often referred to as “multiple scaling”). These are discussed below.

Policy preferences in 1990. According to Mokken (1971), scale H values falling between .3 and .4 should be interpreted as a weak scale, values between .4 and .5 should be interpreted as a moderate scale, and values greater than .50 suggest a strong scale. Using this guideline, Scales 1 and 3 are strong, Scale 2 is moderate, and Scale 4 is weak.

Scale 1: Defense of Allies

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
Saudi Arabia	.681
Kuwait ²	.644
Israel	.510
Eastern Europe	.495
Japan	.477
El Salvador	.302

H = .53

Scale 2: Involvement (general)

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
Active role	.701
Western Europe	.660
Economic aid	.501
Military sales	.355
Military aid	.310

H = .47

The mean values reported for each item reflect the proportion of respondents favoring the internationalist position. The higher the mean, the lower the number of respondents to the left of the cutting point, and thus the “easier” the item. As the item means get progressively lower, we find fewer Americans supporting the internationalist position for these policies. Additionally, the properties of a cumulative scale require that, for instance, respondents who favor U.S. involvement in El Salvador should also tend to favor involvement for all of the preceding “easier” scenarios (Japan, Eastern Europe, Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia).

An examination of the content of the scales suggests that there is a discernible structure to mass preferences in foreign policy. Each scale is dominated by a common frame of reference, and there is little conceptual overlap between scales. Scale 1 contains a variety of specific circumstances under which the U.S. may have an interest in sending troops overseas. The easiest issues, or the policies where there is the greatest level of public support, have to do with the use of U.S. troops in the Gulf

War, a conflict that was on-going at the time the survey was administered (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait², and, to a lesser extent, Israel). Because it was a highly salient issue and the president had taken a decisive pro-involvement stance early on in the crisis, it is not surprising that the public rallied around his position. Related, but more difficult items, involved coming to the aid of an ally threatened with a Soviet invasion or Marxist-influenced revolution. In each case, we have an ally threatened by hostile forces. The most salient scenarios garnered the most support, while the less salient items retained the commitment of a smaller proportion of the public. If we examine the distribution of public preferences on this scale, it appears that about a third of the public is not supportive of any type of internationalism (they fall to the left of the Saudi Arabia cutting point). These would be that segment of the public commonly referred to as “isolationists.” Yet, almost another third of the public is extremely internationalist—they support a U.S. military defense of the El Salvadoran government and all other involvement scenarios as well. About half of the public supports military involvement in all scenarios except El Salvador.

Scale 2 addresses more general issues of involvement. The easiest item on this scale is the question of whether the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs or not. Variants of this item are traditionally used by survey researchers to gauge public support for “internationalism” and “isolationism.” Over two thirds of the public could be classified as “internationalists” by this criterion. An examination of the contents of this scale should reveal that although the public is generally supportive of internationalism, the specific policy tools that are utilized to achieve such policy goals tend to have somewhat less support. Economic aid is favored by about half of the public, with various forms of military assistance being supported by only about one third of Americans.

Also noteworthy is the location of the Western Europe scenario in this scale, because it reveals the political context in which European affairs are evaluated. The security of Western Europe does not fit well in Scale 1, where we find the other scenarios involving the defense of allies. Nor is it related to our commitment to NATO. Rather, it fits in with more general questions about involvement and aid. In other words, when Americans think of military and economic aid, they think of Europe.

There is also a clear preference ordering in the types of aid that Americans are willing to support. Economic aid is most preferred. Military sales have substantially lower levels of support, and military aid slightly less. Almost one third of Americans support all types of assistance.

Scale 3: U.S. invasions

Scale 4: Normalization of relations

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
Kuwait	.600
Panama	.550

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
Vietnam	.565
Cuba	.500

H = .71

H = .32

Scale 3 deals with two instances of U.S. invasions, both of them fairly recent at the time this survey was conducted. Kuwait, the current conflict in this case, has the highest level of support, with Panama coming in at a close second. In both instances, we find a majority of the public in support of the invasion. That these two items don't fit well in Scale 1 is suggestive of the context surrounding the public's evaluations. Scale 1 deals with scenarios under which the public would support the sending of U.S. troops. Scale 3 involves gauging the rate of approval for invasions that had been completed or were underway.⁴ Scale 3 measures approval of President Bush's foreign policy, complete with rally effects,

⁴The survey was conducted between October 23, 1990 and November 15, 1990.

while Scale 1 is a more direct assessment of the circumstances under which citizens would be willing to commit American troops.

Scale 4 contains two items dealing with the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with two communist countries, Vietnam and Cuba. Favoring the normalization of relations with Vietnam is “easier,” but only slightly. About half of the public favors normalization in both cases. The normalization dimension appears to be unrelated to other internationalist policies, including the issue of free trade with Mexico.

Policy preferences in 1994. The clear-cut dimensions found in 1990 have become more muddled by 1994. Scale 1 has been labeled “involvement” because it contains general questions about whether the United States should be involved in the affairs of other nations, as well as modes of involvement (peacekeeping activities, NATO membership, military sales). Scale 1 also contains two scenarios involving the defense of an ally: a North Korean attack on South Korea and a Russian attack on Ukraine. The “easiest” items on the scale revolve around peacekeeping, our NATO commitment, and the desirability of American involvement in world affairs. Well over half of the public is supportive of an internationalist foreign policy on the basis of these items. The defense of Korea garners slightly less than a majority of public support. Only a quarter of the public is willing to defend the Ukraine, South Korea, and express a general commitment to involvement, defense commitments, and peacekeeping. And, by 1994, there is substantially less support for military sales.

As was the case in 1990, the defense of Western Europe and economic aid appear to be linked. However, by 1994, the defense of Western Europe is not as neatly related to general questions of involvement or traditional U.S. foreign policy tools. Rather, our tradition of commitment to Western Europe appears to involve considerations similar to those evoked by questions of economic aid and our more recent commitment to Saudi Arabia. Support for the defense of Western Europe and Saudi Arabia seems to have tapered off somewhat from the levels of 1990, but levels of support for economic aid appear to be unchanged.

Curiously, the NATO item did not scale at all in 1990. In 1994, support for NATO is linked to issues of peacekeeping and the defense of allies, but not the defense of Western Europe (which is, after all, the primary objective of the security community). This provides a clue about the tone of media coverage of NATO-related issues in the mid-1990s. In the earlier survey, NATO was not sufficiently salient to demonstrate a relationship to other involvement scenarios. At the time, our major foreign policy commitment was the defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and coverage centered on the role of U.S. troops, rather than the role of NATO. Thus, citizens were not primed to associate military involvement with our NATO commitment.

Conversely, in 1994, media coverage of foreign policy crises was focused on the events in Bosnia, where NATO had a more active role. American involvement in Bosnia was more indirect, with an emphasis on peacekeeping. Media coverage in the United States was dominated by a pro-Bosnian, rather than a pro-Serbian perspective, and the question of whether the United States should permit arms sales to the Bosnians was hotly debated. In the end, weapons sales to the Bosnians remained banned because political leaders argued that the arming of Bosnia would merely serve to escalate the conflict. This explains why military sales appear to be linked more closely with peacekeeping, NATO, and the general question of international commitment in 1994, and why support for military sales was substantially lower during this time.

Scale 1: Involvement (general)

Scale 2: Defense of Allies (limited)

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
Peacekeeping	.730	Western Europe	.613
NATO	.700	Saudi Arabia	.578
Active role	.596	Economic aid	.498
Korea	.451		
Ukraine	.253	H = .39	
Military sales	.165		

H = .31

The location of Korea and Ukraine in the context of NATO and Bosnian peacekeeping is somewhat puzzling. Items involving the defense of other allies are seen in both Scale 2 and Scale 3. What do Korea and Ukraine have in common that Western Europe, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Poland lack? The only plausible explanation is that a North Korean invasion of South Korea, like a Russian attack Ukraine, may be considered domestic matters, rather than an attack by external forces. This may explain why U.S. involvement in these areas is evaluated in the same context as peacekeeping efforts in the Bosnian conflict.

Scale 3 involves the expansion of NATO membership, as well as the defense of Poland and Israel. In 1994, there was talk of expanding NATO to encompass several Eastern European nations, and possibly even the former Soviet Union. Last month, NATO voted to invite Poland to join its ranks. Scale 3 demonstrates that a majority of the public supports the expansion of NATO, a bare majority support the defense of Israel, and a little over a third would come to the defense of Poland, Israel, and would expand the membership of NATO. Thus, there is a fairly substantial segment of the public that is pro-involvement for all scenarios in this scale.

To view Scales 1, 2, and 3 as unique and unrelated is less appropriate in 1994 than it was in 1990, where the scales tended to be more distinct.. Preferences were more muddled in 1994. Clear thematic boundaries between the scales had blurred, scale H values were lower, and correlations between the involvement and defense of allies scales were more strongly interrelated.⁵

⁵The correlation between Scale 1 and Scale 2 is .61; the correlation between Scale 1 and Scale 3 is .59. Scales 2 and 3 are correlated at .62. All other intercorrelations were .20 or below in 1994. In 1990, Scales 1 and 2 (involvement and the defense of allies) are correlated at .54. Scales 2 and 3 are correlated at .39. Scales 1 and 3 are correlated at .36. All other intercorrelations are .15 or less.

Scale 3: Involvement (limited)

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
NATO expansion	.564
Israel	.502
Poland	.392

H = .30

Scale 4: Defense technology

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
CIA	.546
Defense spending	.184
Military aid	.045

H = .32

Scale 4, however, is fairly distinct, and contains several items (CIA, defense spending) that did not scale at all in 1990. The common theme underlying Scale 4 appears to be the use of American military technology, whether for the purpose of surveillance and attempts to overthrow the governments of other countries, as a means of providing assistance to an ally, or the actual funding of such weapons programs. By 1994, the only item in this scale receiving the support of a majority of the public is the role of the CIA. This is approximately the same level of support the CIA received in 1990. The other items in the scale have become more difficult. Less than 20 percent of the public supports increases in defense spending, and less than five percent would provide military assistance to other countries. A comparison of all of the scales developed in 1994 suggests that while the public is generally supportive of an internationalist foreign policy, support is highest in the area of peacekeeping and involvement in defense communities. Economic aid and the use of troops to defend traditional allies receives somewhat less support, with the least preferred policies being the use of troops to defend peripheral allies and the use of military assistance.

As was the case in 1990, the normalization of relations with communist countries items all scale together, with the restoration of diplomatic relations with Vietnam receiving the highest level of public support. A majority of Americans also support the normalization of relations with North Korea and Cuba, with a little over 40 percent supporting normalization of relations for all countries mentioned, including Iran (which can be characterized as a terrorist, rather than a communist country).

Scale 5: Normalization of Relations

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>
Vietnam	.647
North Korea	.576
Cuba	.505
Iran	.416

H = .77

Multidimensionality

Because we were able to create several unidimensional scales in each year studied, there is some evidence of multidimensionality in policy preferences (Sijtsma, Debets, and Molenaar 1990). While this is not a new conclusion, it may be a more reliable indicator of multidimensionality than the approaches that have traditionally been used. Ten Berge (1972) found that when the same items used in a Mokken scale are used in a factor analysis, the factor analysis often produces additional “difficulty” factors to account for differences in *p*-values (see also Gillespie et al. for similar findings). These difficulty factors are not really additional dimensions, but merely reflect the inability of the procedure to accommodate items with substantially different probabilities. With a cumulative scaling model, we can feel more

certain that, through multiple scaling, we have produced substantive dimensions. Moreover, within each dimension, we have a transitive ordering of policy preferences.

And, the technique used here permits us to draw a different kind of conclusion than would a factor analysis or a multidimensional scaling procedure. Rather than merely finding out about differences in individual attitudes, we can examine the structure of mass opinion, and the political context in which policies are evaluated. In this analysis, we see that not all policies are perceived as internationalist *to the same degree*. Some policies fall much closer to the isolationist end of the spectrum. Thus using respondents' preferences for sending U.S. troops to the defense of Saudi Arabia, for example, is much less indicative of an internationalist orientation than is support for sending U.S. troops to the defense of El Salvador. Therefore, it may be perfectly consistent for an individual to support U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia and oppose all other forms of internationalism. And, it is also perfectly consistent for an individual to support sending U.S. troops to all of the locations in Scale 1 except for El Salvador in 1990. A traditional factor analysis would not reveal this level of structure in public preferences.

Non-scalable Policies

There were several items that failed to fit into any scale. In 1990, these included: NAFTA, Israel², defense spending, South Korea, Mexico, Philippines, NATO, China, CIA and drugs. In two cases, the pairwise H values between two items was almost sufficient to form a scale. For NATO and China, and also CIA and drugs, pairwise H values reached .27.

The failure of defense spending to fit into any of the scales suggests that the decision to commit the country to activities overseas does not involve monetary considerations. It may be the case that defense spending is viewed as a budgetary item, rather than an issue of national security (see Jacoby 1994).

The item on drug policy exhibited a similar pattern in 1990. It had low pairwise H values with almost every other item, except for the item on the CIA. Yet, 1990 was in the middle of President Bush's term in office, and a very visible aspect of Bush's agenda was his anti-drug policy. This suggests that U.S. drug policy has been framed more as a domestic issue than an issue of international politics. The lack of a relationship between preferences on drug policy and support for the U.S. invasion of Panama lends additional credence to this interpretation.

In 1994, NATO became linked to the new item on peacekeeping, as well as defense commitments in Ukraine and South Korea. The CIA and defense spending became linked together with military aid. New items including approval of U.S. actions in Haiti and intervention in a civil conflict in South Africa did not scale. And, as was the case in 1990, issues of tariffs and free trade did not fit well with any of the other foreign policy scales that were created.

Trade issues appeared to be evaluated using a set of considerations independent from other foreign policy issues, a finding that has been noted by other researchers, as well (for example, see Sulfaro 1996). Preferences about pressuring Israel to create a Palestinian homeland, reactions to the Chinese government's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, the possibility of a Mexican or Philippine civil war, and the invasion of Japan by Russian forces all appear to be governed by unique considerations as well. This indicates that political leaders have not been successful in framing these scenarios in the context of existing policy dimensions, such as the defense of allies, or more general involvement goals.

Sources of Foreign Policy Preferences

In order to determine the underlying sources of structure in mass preferences on international involvement, a set of regression analyses were conducted where the dependent variables were the Mokken scales created above. Measures of basic political orientations and socio-demographic characteristics constituted the independent variables in the analysis.⁶ The results for 1990 and 1994 are reported in Appendices 3 and 4, respectively. In each case, positive values indicate greater support for the internationalist end of the scale, and negative values indicate support for more isolationist policies.

In 1990, each of the scales exhibits some amount of ideological division among the mass public. Specifically, more conservative people also tend to be more internationalist in most cases. The only exception is the normalization of relations with Communist countries, where conservatives tend to be more opposed to normalization, or more isolationist. By 1994, this ideological division seems to have dissipated. The only ideological cleavage in 1994 occurs on the defense spending/use of the CIA scale. Here, conservatives tend to be more supportive of CIA attempts to overthrow the governments of other countries, higher levels of defense spending, and the use of military aid.⁷

Partisanship does not appear to influence policy preferences outside of ideology in 1990. In 1994, Democrats are less supportive of the use of the CIA and defense spending, and are more supportive of normalization of relations with Communist countries (and Iran). These divisions merely reinforce ideological divisions evident in both years.

Beliefs about the powers of the presidency influenced preferences only in the case of American military invasions in 1990. Here, people who view the executive as the appropriate source of power in foreign policy decision making are more likely to approve of American military actions.

Exposure to international news led to greater support for internationalism for the scales involving involvement and the support of allies in both 1990 and 1994, although it had little effect on approval of recent invasions, defense spending and the use of the CIA, or the normalization of relations. This is one of the most consistent patterns evident in this data. Yet, it suggests no enduring partisan or ideological rifts in the mass public. Rather, those who are more attentive to international politics tend to be more supportive of involvement. As we see in 1994, extensive coverage of international crises such as the Bosnian conflict can lead to very high levels of public support for involvement in peacekeeping operations. This same pattern is evident in 1990 for questions about the defense of Saudi Arabia and the importance of the U.S. taking an active role in world politics. When media coverage tapers off and the issue becomes less salient, as Saudi Arabia was by 1994, support diminishes somewhat.

⁶Ideology is coded such that higher values indicate more conservative positions. The CFR did not consistently ask people their partisanship, so a proxy measure was used in 1994. The proxy measured the amount by which respondents preferred Clinton's handling of foreign policy to Bush's. Positive values in both years indicate a preference for Democrats. Presidential power is a measure of support for presidential, rather than congressional, control of foreign policy. Higher values indicate greater approval of presidential power. International news is a measure of interest in and exposure to newspaper coverage of international affairs, with higher values indicating greater interest/more exposure. Education is a scale where higher values indicate more years of formal schooling. Hispanics and blacks are dummy variables coded as zeros for whites and ones for the respective minorities. Women is a dummy variable coded as one for men. Catholics and Jews are dummy variables coded as zeros for others, and ones for the respective religious affiliations.

⁷Note that the first two of these items did not scale in 1990. And, by 1994, support for military aid has eroded substantially from about 30 percent of the public to less than five percent.

Higher levels of education led to greater levels of support for internationalism for the general involvement and the normalization of relations scales in 1990. By 1994, the magnitude of this variable had become a bit smaller. Education still led to greater support for the defense of allies and the normalization of relations, and it also resulted in slightly less support for defense spending and the use of the CIA.

The effects of ethnicity were mixed. In 1990, Hispanics were less supportive of U.S. invasions than were whites, presumably due to disagreement with Bush's Panama policy. In 1994, Hispanics demonstrated no discernible differences in policy preferences from whites. It is almost important to note that Hispanics are no more or less supportive of normalizing U.S. relations with Cuba, once ideology and partisanship are taken into account. Race showed somewhat stronger effects in the case of black citizens. In 1990, blacks were more likely than whites to take isolationist positions on the involvement, defense of allies, and approval of U.S. invasion scales. Race had no effect on preferences regarding the normalization of relations. In 1994, blacks were more isolationist than whites only for the more limited involvement scale. Blacks and whites exhibited similar preferences in the area of defense spending and the use of the CIA and the normalization of relations in both years, and in general questions of involvement and the support of allies in 1994.

Women exhibited an isolationist tendency more consistently than did ethnic minorities. In both 1990 and 1994, women were more isolationist than men on broad issues of involvement and the defense of allies. Women were also more likely to oppose the normalization of relations with Communist countries and Iran in 1990, although this difference dissipated by 1994. Women were no less supportive of U.S. invasions in 1990 than men, a finding well-supported by other researchers who have found that women are more opposed to the use of force in general, but as supportive of military action as men in a time of crisis (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Fine, Genest, and Wilcon 1990; Cook and Wilcon 1991).

Religious cleavages in policy preferences are not common in either year studied. In 1990, Catholics are more isolationist than Protestants and other groups only for the defense of allies scale. Yet, in 1994, Catholics are more internationalist than these same groups for the more limited involvement scale. The 1994 case is somewhat easier to explain. The limited involvement scale contains items on the defense of Israel and Poland, and the connection between Catholicism and Poland is fairly salient. In 1990, Catholics appear to be less supportive than others of the defense of Eastern Europe (a broader interpretation of Polish interests) and Israel. The scenarios are similar, and the risks to the United States are not appreciably larger in 1990 than in 1994. The difference may be due to some of the other scenarios in the defense of allies scale which may be counteracting the effects of Eastern Europe, or it may be due to some change in the Church's position on the use of force from one time period to the next.

Jewish citizens have preferences very similar to Protestant and other non-Catholic religious groups in most cases. In 1990, Jews were more supportive of the normalization of relations with Communist countries and Iran, although this difference is not evident by 1994. Jews were not more internationalist in the defense of allies (including Israel) scale in 1990, although they are more internationalist for this scenario in 1994 (as were Catholics).

The purpose of the regression analysis was not to explain the bulk of the variation in the Mokken scales. Because of the probabilistic nature of the scales, and because it is likely that any serious cleavages in the public compromise the ability of any one series of scales to effectively explain differences in most

individuals, high R^2 values were not anticipated.⁸ Rather, our concern has been to determine which variables, if any, highlight statistically significant differences among groups in the mass public. Overall, the results of the regression analysis point to partisan and ideological differences in 1990 that are no longer evident by 1994. Partisan and ideological differences in the mid-1990s center on issues of defense spending (consistent with cleavages on spending issues rather than any cleavages in support for internationalism) and normalization of relations with Communist countries. These differences do not extend to any of the more basic issues of involvement and the defense of allies.

Women and blacks are the only socio-demographic groups demonstrating any kind of consistent pattern in their foreign policy preferences. That is, in many cases these individuals are more isolationist than are other members of the public.

In most cases, the variables that are relevant in 1990 are somewhat less relevant in 1994. The strongest source of differences in foreign policy preferences in 1994 is exposure to international news. Over both years studied, greater exposure to international news leads to greater support for internationalist policies. This link between exposure and internationalist preferences may indicate that policymakers can secure the public's support for a proposed course of action by playing up the proposal to the press, or, alternatively, that the press can generate pressure on policymakers to expand American involvement in international politics by focusing coverage on a crisis area.

CONCLUSIONS

The most important conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that public preferences on issues of international involvement *are* structured, and that preferences are ordered in a transitive fashion. Because of differences in the manner in which issues are framed, there are substantial differences in the way policies are evaluated. Specifically, in many cases, the public regards decisions about whether to send U.S. troops to the defense of our allies as a separate concern from more general questions about whether the nation ought to be actively involved in international politics. Moreover, preferences on economic and military assistance are also evaluated independently of these scenarios involving the defense of our allies. The manner in which issues are linked appears to be heavily dependent on the political climate in which they are evaluated. Many of the issue linkages evidenced in 1990 had altered substantially by 1994.

Once we understand these differences in issue framing and evaluation, we can begin to understand why so many researchers come to the faulty conclusion that public opinion on foreign policy is unstructured, or internally inconsistent. First, the general question on whether the U.S. should be involved in international politics is an inadequate measure of the levels of internationalist and isolationist sentiment in the mass public. It is unrelated to specific policy scenarios, and tells us nothing about public support for invasions or the normalization of trade relations with other countries. Moreover, it tends to fall on the isolationist end of the involvement dimension. It is the easiest commitment to make, and a substantial segment of the public is willing to commit to the idea of involvement and yet not support policies such as the defense of Western Europe from a Soviet invasion or the providing of military or economic assistance to other countries. Additionally, some issues (the defense of Japan, U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China, involvement in South Africa) lack a common frame of

⁸The basic argument here is that if there are substantial sources of difference among individuals, then the content and arrangement of these scales will probably differ from one individual to the next. This is relevant only if we care about efficient prediction of individual attitudes.

reference. In these cases, it is also inappropriate to make inferences about specific policies from general preferences about internationalism.

We can also learn something about the scope of opinion in which public debates take place. Very few Americans are true isolationists. That is, very few individuals fall to the left of the easiest cutting point on most scales. In many cases, a full third of the public supports *all* internationalist policies contained within the dimension. For most policy issues, even absent a salient threat, policymakers can expect a majority, or near majority level of support for internationalist objectives. For salient scenarios, support climbs even higher. There are various levels of support for internationalism within each context, or dimension.

Viewing support for government policies as indicative of an internationalist stance *or* an isolationist stance misses the point. Rather, we should recognize that some individuals have preferences that are “more isolationist” and some have preferences that are “more internationalist.” Within the mass public, policy preferences do appear to be ordered in a consistent manner. Some individuals are supportive of involvement as a general goal, or in response to a particularly salient threat, but do not support a variety of other involvement scenarios. These preferences are much closer to the isolationist end of the continuum than the internationalist end of the spectrum. “True” isolationist sentiment is confined to a minority of the mass public. Tolerance for some forms of involvement does not necessarily translate into tolerance for all forms of involvement. Moreover, preference for low-risk involvement only is not inconsistent, nor does it suggest instability in mass attitudes. Rather, we need to recognize that the public utilizes a variety of different considerations in evaluating government policies, and appears to be very capable of formulating a large number of organized, consistent preferences on the basis of these considerations.

Ultimately, these findings may suggest that in the area of foreign policy, most segments of the mass public are malleable. In addition to the link between media exposure and internationalism, the data presented here demonstrate that when a problem area such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Bosnia receives a high amount of media exposure, the public tends to be very permissive of U.S. involvement. Public opinion on international involvement, then, is not static, but dynamic. It changes as events change, and as crises arise. In these cases, the tendency toward internationalism is even more pronounced.

Appendix 1

P-Matrix for Scale 1

	SAUDI ARABIA	KUWAIT2	ISRAEL	EAST EUROPE	JAPAN	EL SALVADOR
SAUDI ARABIA	—	.569	.473	.416	.410	.264
KUWAIT2	.569	—	.422	.408	.385	.255
ISRAEL	.473	.422	—	.343*	.343*	.227
EAST EUROPE	.416	.408	.343*	—	.333	.220
JAPAN	.410	.385	.343*	.333	—	.200
EL SALVADOR	.264	.255	.227	.220	.200	—

*Items are not actually tied. Figures were rounded.

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

P-Matrix for Scale 2

	ACTIVE ROLE	WESTERN EUROPE	ECONOMIC AID	MILITARY SALES	MILITARY AID
ACTIVE ROLE	—	.500	.440	.283	.259
WESTERN EUROPE	.500	—	.367	.282	.235
ECONOMIC AID	.440	.367	—	.212	.209
MILITARY SALES	.283	.282	.212	—	.199
MILITARY AID	.259	.235	.209	.199	—

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

Appendix 2

P-Matrix for Scale 1

	PEACEKEEPING	NATO	ACTIVE ROLE	KOREA	UKRAINE	MILITARY SALES
PEACEKEEPING	—	.574	.531	.410	.229	.144
NATO	.574	—	.472	.350	.198	.131
ACTIVE ROLE	.531	.472	—	.326	.176	.129
KOREA	.410	.350	.326	—	.163	.105
UKRAINE	.229	.198	.176	.163	—	.056
MILITARY SALES	.144	.131	.129	.105	.056	—

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

P-Matrix for Scale 2

	WESTERN EUROPE	SAUDI ARABIA	ECONOMIC AID
WESTERN EUROPE	—	.476	.348
SAUDI ARABIA	.476	—	.309
ECONOMIC AID	.348	.309	—

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

P-Matrix for Scale 3

	NATO EXPANSION	ISRAEL	POLAND
NATO EXPANSION	—	.329	.278
ISRAEL	.329	—	.274
POLAND	.278	.274	—

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

P-Matrix for Scale 4

	CIA	DEFENSE SPENDING	MILITARY AID
CIA	—	.133	.026
DEFENSE SPENDING	.133	—	.019
MILITARY AID	.026	.019	—

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

P-Matrix for Scale 5

	VIETNAM	NORTH KOREA	CUBA	IRAN
VIETNAM	—	.538	.464	.406
NORTH KOREA	.538	—	.438	.389
CUBA	.464	.438	—	.371
IRAN	.406	.389	.371	—

Note: Items are arrayed from “easiest” to “hardest.” Cell entries are probabilities of a positive response for both items.

Appendix 3

Regression Coefficients for Foreign Policy Scales, 1990

	Scale 1	Scale 2	Scale 3	Scale 4
Ideology	.41* (.08)	.13* (.06)	.20* (.02)	-.18* (.04)
Partisanship	-.14 (.17)	-.03 (.12)	-.09 (.05)	.09 (.08)
Pres. power	-.14 (.11)	-.08 (.08)	.14* (.03)	-.08 (.05)
Internat'l news	.39* (.13)	.29* (.09)	-.01 (.04)	.07 (.06)
Education	-.05 (.05)	.21* (.04)	.00 (.01)	.17* (.02)
Hispanics	.36 (.33)	-.41 (.22)	-.23* (.10)	-.02 (.15)
Blacks	-.55* (.27)	-.42* (.21)	-.36* (.08)	-.15 (.13)
Women	-.60* (.16)	-.40* (.11)	-.05 (.04)	-.33* (.07)
Catholics	-.43* (.18)	-.25 (.13)	.01 (.05)	.05 (.08)
Jews	.26 (.64)	.19 (.39)	.16 (.17)	.55* (.28)
Intercept	.66	.33	.16	2.56
Adj. R ²	.11	.12	.11	.09
N	600	651	1250	1117

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors
**prob.* .05, two-tailed test

Appendix 4

Regression Coefficients for Foreign Policy Scales, 1994

	Scale 1	Scale 2	Scale 3	Scale 4	Scale 5
Ideology	.01 (.06)	.02 (.05)	.02 (.04)	.10* (.02)	-.03 (.06)
Partisanship	.04 (.13)	-.09 (.12)	-.03 (.09)	-.16* (.05)	.38* (.13)
Pres. power	-.03 (.07)	-.06 (.07)	.07 (.05)	.02 (.03)	-.14 (.07)
Internat'l news	.32* (.08)	.24* (.07)	.23* (.06)	-.05 (.03)	.07 (.08)
Education	.03 (.04)	.12* (.03)	.04 (.03)	-.05* (.02)	.09* (.04)
Hispanics	-.27 (.27)	-.13 (.25)	-.17 (.17)	-.06 (.10)	.41 (.25)
Blacks	-.14 (.21)	-.38 (.20)	-.37* (.15)	-.15 (.08)	.22 (.20)
Women	-.27* (.12)	-.22* (.10)	-.08 (.08)	-.06 (.05)	-.12 (.11)
Catholics	.20 (.14)	-.02 (.12)	.26* (.09)	.01 (.05)	.07 (.13)
Jews	.55 (.52)	.37 (.42)	.72* (.28)	.14 (.18)	-.06 (.42)
Intercept	1.35	.54	.25	.77	1.46
Adj. R ²	.03	.09	.06	.07	.03
N	543	410	674	887	851

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors
 **prob.* .05, two-tailed test

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