

Political Sophistication and the Presidential Campaign:
citizen reactions to campaign advertisements

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Paper prepared for presentation at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 23-25.

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For the past two presidential elections, releases of the American National Election Study have included a series of items on the content of campaign advertisements along with the traditional measures of political attitudes and political behaviors. Public opinion research has suggested that campaign advertisements are a valuable source of information on candidate issue positions for voters (Patterson and McClure 1976; Just, Crigler, and Wallach 1990; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Yet, we also know that not all citizens process information in the same way. Political learning and political judgments may vary in both process and output according to a citizen's level of political sophistication, or expertise.

There have been numerous studies in recent years on the effects of political sophistication on political attitudes and behavior. Researchers have found sophisticated citizens to be more ideological in their political evaluations (Jacoby 1986, 1991; Knight 1985), to rely more heavily on cognitive (versus affective) cues in forming political judgments (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991), to exhibit more expertise in the use of political parties as reference groups (Jacoby 1988), to demonstrate more constraint in their issue positions (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964), to have more extensive systems of belief system organization (Neuman 1981; Luskin 1987; see also Hamill and Lodge 1986; Sears, Huddy, and Shaffer 1986), and to process candidate information more effectively in a demanding environment (Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994).

The theme is clear: sophisticated citizens process information differently than non-sophisticated citizens. While political scientists may disagree on occasion as to what these differences are, there is little disagreement about the importance of political sophistication as a variable. Any attempts to measure the effects of campaign advertisements on political attitudes should take these important differences into account.

Differences in the Recollection of Political Advertisements

One of the basic sources of differences in political attitudes between sophisticated and less sophisticated voters is exposure to political information. Many studies have found that politically sophisticated individuals are more interested in and informed about politics than their less sophisticated counterparts (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964, 1975, 1980; Neuman 1986; Sulfaro 1997). Thus, Luskin (1987) has defined political sophistication as "political expertise." The greater the level of political sophistication, the more organized the political belief system (Neuman 1981; Luskin 1987; see also Hamill and Lodge 1986; Sears, Huddy, and Shaffer 1986). The more organized the political belief system, the greater the amount of information held by an individual, and the greater the capacity for processing, storing, and retrieving information (c.f. Downs 1957; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Hagner and Pierce 1982; Hamill and Lodge 1986; Conover and Feldman 1986; Luskin 1987; Smith 1989; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994).

Moreover, Conover and Feldman (1986) claim that these differences in belief system organization lead to differences in information processing strategies. Specifically, they claim that “novices tend to use ‘confirmatory’ strategies, whereas experts are more likely to adopt ‘disconfirmatory’ strategies” (p.136). As a result, less sophisticated individuals should rely more on political information that is consistent with their pre-existing knowledge and values. More sophisticated individuals should be better equipped to assimilate knowledge that is inconsistent with their pre-existing beliefs (see also Fiske, Kinder, and Larter, 1983.)

In the context of a presidential election campaign, we should expect to find that more sophisticated citizens should exhibit a greater familiarity with campaign advertisements as a result of their greater levels of exposure to political information and their higher levels of interest and involvement in politics. Exposure and recall may also be influenced by pre-existing knowledge and values. In particular, what an individual remembers from a political advertisement may be influenced by their political party identification. Numerous studies have suggested that voters rely most on decision making shortcuts, or schemata, that are chronically accessible (Higgins and King 1981; Hamill and Lodge 1986; Lau 1989). Accessibility is a function of both the level of political sophistication of the individual and the political context in which the information is being evaluated (Lau 1989; Iyengar 1990; Zaller 1992).

While schemata such as ideology tend to be fairly complex, and not well-developed in the political belief systems of most citizens (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Conover and Feldman 1986; Jacoby 1989), partisanship is a shortcut available to most citizens (Conover and Feldman 1986; Rahn 1993). And, the political environment of a presidential election campaign should serve to prime most voters to be attentive to partisan differences in candidates and policy positions. At the same time, experts—that is, politically sophisticated citizens—should be more adept at evaluating information in a partisan context (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Jacoby 1988).

Thus, we should expect to find several differences between more sophisticated and less sophisticated citizens in their recollections of campaign advertisements:

- more sophisticated citizens should have a higher number of recollections than less sophisticated citizens because they are more attentive to political information
- less sophisticated citizens should be more likely to remember details of ads run by their own party’s candidate due to reliance on confirmatory information-processing strategies

If we take the valence of an ad recollection into account, we can generate several corollary expectations:

- for ads that are perceived as negative or contain negative information, less sophisticated citizens should associate recollections more strongly with the opposition party candidate; for ads that are perceived as positive or contain positive information, less sophisticated citizens should associate recollections more strongly with the candidate of their own political party

- more sophisticated citizens should be more likely to recall inconsistent information. That is, more sophisticated citizens should remember more positive things about the opposition party's candidate than should less sophisticated citizens. By this same token, more sophisticated citizens should also be more likely than less sophisticated citizens to remember negative information about their own party's candidate.

Differences in the Sources of Candidate Evaluations

Establishing that citizens differ in the amount and type of information they recall from campaign advertisements is only helpful if it can shed light on how that information is used. In particular, we would like to answer the question: do differences in the nature of information processed and stored by citizens lead to fundamental differences in the way candidates are evaluated?

The findings here are mixed. In the context of a presidential election, sophisticated citizens have been found to rely more heavily on broad, abstract judgmental cues such as ideology and partisanship in formulating both issue judgments and candidate evaluations (Knight 1985; Jacoby 1991). In the context of off-year congressional elections, however, Sulfaro (1996) found that similar cues were used by both groups of citizens, although sophisticated voters tended to use them more effectively.

Recent research has suggested a new way of looking at differences in citizen decision making. Rather than focus on the greater ability of political experts to make ideological and partisan inferences about candidates and their policy positions, we need to seek out the types of cues that less sophisticated citizens rely on. The standard belief in public opinion is that sophisticated citizens have attitudes that are more predictable; however, our ability to predict is rooted in an examination of those cues that are most likely to be utilized by more sophisticated citizens. Less sophisticated citizens may have attitudes that are equally predictable, given the proper variables.

For example, while Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) found that sophisticated citizens relied more heavily on ideological cues in evaluating policy issues, they also found that less sophisticated citizens used alternative cues in formulating judgments. Specifically, they found that less sophisticated citizens were often guided by a "likability heuristic" where evaluations were determined by an individual's affective reaction toward groups expected to benefit from the policy under consideration. If an individual expressed warm feelings toward the group, they were more likely to support policies that they perceived as benefiting the group. Cold feelings toward a group led to opposition to policies associated with the group.

If affective assessments of societal groups can guide policy judgments among some voters, then they may shape candidate evaluations as well. Ultimately, candidate evaluations are affective reactions of potential voters to a candidate's perceived personality and policies. For sophisticated citizens, the effects of the partisan filter should be strong; candidate partisanship should mold the evaluation regardless of the range of inconsistent information the citizen has been able to process about the candidate (see Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; also Brody and Page 1972; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979).

Rahn et al. (1994) theorize that sophisticated citizens are more reliant on on-line information processing strategies where an initial consideration such as partisan identification may form the core of an evaluation early on in the campaign (see also Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). While the evaluation may be updated with each new piece of information the potential voter receives, the presence of the partisan filter and the processing strategy used should preclude any significant effects resulting from the memory of particular ads. They claim: "...when a voter has used the on-line method, there is no necessary relationship between the evaluative implications of recalled information about a candidate and overall evaluations of him or her" (p.585).

For less sophisticated citizens, partisanship should be a weaker filter, and evaluations of candidates may be more emotional in nature. As such, memories of what the citizen learned about the candidate from political advertisements may play a greater role in shaping feelings about a candidate (Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning; but, see Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). A negative memory may lead to less affect, while a positive memory may generate greater affect.

DATA AND MEASURES

Data for this analysis will come from the 1992 and 1996 American National Election Studies. In both studies, citizens were asked about their recollections of campaign advertisements.¹ Up to five responses per respondent were coded.² Creating measures of what respondents recalled from political attitudes proved to be a difficult endeavor. The NES coding scheme permitted up to five different recollections. Recalls were open-ended; citizens could remark on their overall evaluation of a candidate's ad ("there were too many"; "they provide useful information"), or they could mention specific details about the ad's content (such as Clinton's record on employment or Dole's position on taxes). The master codes reveal details about the content of the ads that were recalled in some cases, but not in others ("R describes ad concerning a specific issue, e.g., Medicare, abortion, gay rights, etc.").

For these reasons, the advertisement recall questions were of limited utility. It was not possible, for example, to test propositions about the correlation between responses to "most important national problems" questions and specific themes recalled from campaign ads. In many cases, that information simply was not coded in a usable way. However, there was still much valuable information to be gleaned from what respondents remembered about the political ads they saw. Specifically, ad recollections were coded along several mutually exclusive themes:

Subjects:

- *Clinton*: was the recollection about a Clinton ad (1992 and 1996)
- *Dole/Bush*: was the recollection about a Bush ad (1992) or a Dole ad (1996)

¹In the 1992 study, respondents were asked if they recalled any of the presidential campaign advertisements. In 1996, a similar recall question was asked, but respondents were not limited to ads run by presidential candidates.

²In 1992, respondents were asked "what do you remember about any of these ads." In 1996, however, respondents were asked to focus on "the one ad you remember best." It is not clear what kind of effect, if any, this difference should have on the results.

Valence:

- *positive*: was the recollection positive in tone, or did the respondent recall a positive (as opposed to an attack) theme from the ad
- *negative*: was the recollection negative in tone, or did the respondent recall a negative (attack-oriented) theme from the ad³

In each case, respondents were assigned a value of zero if they did not make such a response, and a one if they did. The coding rules for the master code categories are provided in the Appendix. Creating dummy variables in this fashion permitted the largest possible pool of respondents; respondents who remembered no ads were, in many cases, grouped with respondents who lacked a particular type of recollection. These themes were then used to construct a series of variables based on combinations of subjects and valence.

Other variables of interest include measures of political sophistication,⁴ partisanship, and candidate evaluations:

- *sophistication*: derived from the summary measure of education. Citizens were coded as zeroes if they had a high school education or less (including those who obtained a high school diploma or GED). Citizens were coded as ones if they had any schooling beyond high school.
- *partisanship*: a seven-point scale where low values correspond to stronger Democratic attachments and higher values correspond to stronger Republican attachments.
- *candidate affect*: a 100-point feeling thermometer where lower values indicate feelings of “coolness” toward the candidate and high values indicate “warmer” feelings about the candidate. Candidates evaluated include Clinton and Bush in 1992 and Dole and Clinton in 1996.
- *candidate personality characteristics*: a four-point scale where low numbers corresponded to more positive assessments and higher numbers indicated less positive assessments. Characteristics examined in both 1992 and 1996 included: intelligence, compassion, moral, inspiring, leader, cares about people, knowledgeable, honest, and gets things done.⁵

³Neutral recollections would not be counted as either a positive or a negative recollection.

⁴Other measures were considered. However, the contents of the 1996 NES severely limited choices in this area. The small number of political knowledge items (relative to previous surveys) created a scenario where either 5 percent or 40 percent of respondents could be labeled as “sophisticated.” Similarly, interviewer estimates of intelligence and information levels were overly generous. However, recent studies (Sulfaro 1997) suggest that most commonly used measures of political sophistication fall along a similar dimension, and predict related behaviors such as political interest and political activity in ways that are virtually indistinguishable.

⁵In 1996, respondents were asked whether they thought Clinton was intelligent and compassionate, but they were not asked these questions about Dole.

FINDINGS

Ad Recollection and Inconsistent Information

In order to examine whether more sophisticated citizens are also more likely to remember inconsistent information (in this case, ads about the opposition party's candidate), the average number of responses made to the campaign advertisement questions were broken down by candidate, and also by the partisanship and level of sophistication of the respondent.

For the purposes of this analysis, Democrats and Independents leaning toward the Democratic party were coded as Democrats, Republicans and Independents leaning toward the Republican party are coded as Republicans, and true Independents are omitted.⁶

The average number of recollections per candidate in 1992, broken down by sophistication and partisanship, is reported in Table 1 below. Looking across the rows at partisan differences in ad recollections, the differences were not in the direction predicted. That is, citizens were expected to remember more ads from their own party's candidate than from the opposition party's candidate. Yet, in every case, citizens were more likely to remember a Bush ad than a Clinton ad. This may be due to Bush's high profile as an incumbent president, or perhaps because he simply ran more campaign advertisements.

Table 1. Average Number of Ad Recollections by Candidate, 1992

		Bush	Clinton	
Democrats	low sophistication	.32	.18	$t = 5.51$
	(N = 865)	(.62)	(.42)	
	high sophistication	.42	.27	$t = 3.55$
	(N = 341)	(.66)	(.51)	
		$t = -2.37$	$t = -3.40$	
Republicans	low sophistication	.26	.16	$t = 3.53$
	(N = 569)	(.53)	(.41)	
	high sophistication	.39	.17	$t = 5.24$
	(N = 327)	(.63)	(.43)	
		$t = -3.15$	$t = -0.33$	

Source: 1992 National Election Study

Note: Cell entries are mean number of candidate recollections. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. T-statistics are calculated across rows to measure partisan differences in mean recollections and down columns to measure differences in recollections as a function of political sophistication.

Looking down the columns at differences in recollections across levels of sophistication, we find that sophisticated citizens are generally better at remembering ads regardless of the candidate. Among Democrats, sophisticated citizens remembered more Bush ads and more Clinton ads. This finding supports theoretical expectations that sophisticated citizens are more

⁶Keith et al (1992) find that Independent Leaners often behave in a more consistently partisan fashion than weak partisan identifiers. Thus, they are expected to utilize partisan cues in the same fashion as citizens who are willing to adopt a party label.

effective processors of political information, including information which is inconsistent with their political orientations.

Among Republicans, sophisticated citizens were more likely than non-sophisticated citizens to recall ads run by their own party's candidate. However, the expected differences in recollections of Clinton ads did not materialize. That is, sophisticated citizens were expected to be better-equipped to remember opposition party ads, but the results in Table 1 clearly show that more sophisticated and less sophisticated Republicans remembered about the same number of items from Clinton ads.

The average number of ad recollections reported by citizens in 1996 is reported in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Average Number of Ad Recollections by Candidate, 1996

		Dole	Clinton	
Democrats	low sophistication	.33	.28	$t = 1.32$
	(N = 626)	(.64)	(.66)	
	high sophistication	.42	.35	$t = 1.24$
	(N = 310)	(.66)	(.75)	
	$t = -1.96$	$t = -1.40$		
Republicans	low sophistication	.41	.25	$t = 3.34$
	(N = 374)	(.70)	(.61)	
	high sophistication	.40	.37	$t = 0.51$
	(N = 278)	(.63)	(.75)	
	$t = 0.19$	$t = -2.19$		

Source: 1996 National Election Study

Note: Cell entries are mean number of candidate recollections. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. T-statistics are calculated across rows to measure partisan differences in mean recollections and down columns to measure differences in recollections as a function of political sophistication.

For Democrats, there were no statistically significant partisan differences in the number of recollections about Clinton ads and the number of recollections of Dole ads. The mean number of recollections was similar across political parties for individuals at both levels of sophistication. Moreover, among Democrats, political sophistication did not have an effect on the memory of Clinton's ads. The average number of recollections of ads involving Clinton was about the same for all Democrats.

However, the number of recollections about the opposition-party candidate did tend to vary as a function of political sophistication, and in the manner that was expected. Sophisticated Democrats tended to recall more from Dole-sponsored ads than did less sophisticated Democrats. This provides some support for the hypothesis that sophisticated citizens are more likely to use a disconfirmatory information-processing strategy; they appear to be somewhat more able to process inconsistent information.

Among Republicans, we did find the expected partisan differences in the recollection of campaign ads among less sophisticated citizens. Specifically, less sophisticated Republicans

were more likely to recall details of Dole ads than they were Clinton ads, providing support for the hypothesis of confirmatory information-processing.

For ads run by their own party's candidate, there were no meaningful differences in the number of recollections among more and less sophisticated citizens. But, since this is consistent information, both groups of citizens should be able to process and retrieve it. However, for Clinton ads, sophisticated citizens tended to remember more.

Valence and Consistency

Next, we want to examine how the valence of a memory is affected by both partisanship and political sophistication. Again, we expect more consistency among less sophisticated citizens and less consistency among more sophisticated citizens.

The focus of this analysis will be the first coded campaign ad recollection only. While a majority of our respondents were able to offer at least one recollection, this percentage dropped off dramatically for the second and third recollections. By the fourth and fifth responses, fewer than 5 percent of all respondents had usable answers. Since the first recollection was likely to be the most salient one, it should be an appropriate subject for examining the hypothesized partisan differences.

Table 3. Negative Ad Recollections (first recall only), 1992

		Negative Bush	Negative Clinton	
Democrats	low sophistication (N = 865)	.12 (.32)	.04 (.19)	$t = 6.78$
	high sophistication (N = 341)	.11 (.31)	.05 (.22)	$t = 2.57$
		$t = 0.51$	$t = -0.85$	
Republicans	low sophistication (N = 569)	.06 (.24)	.05 (.23)	$t = 0.72$
	high sophistication (N = 327)	.11 (.31)	.05 (.22)	$t = 2.83$
		$t = -2.50$	$t = 0.00$	

Source: 1992 National Election Study

Note: Cell entries are mean valence of candidate recollections.⁷ Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. T-statistics are calculated across rows to measure partisan differences in mean recollections and down columns to measure differences in recollections as a function of political sophistication.

Table 3 shows the distribution of negative advertisement recollections in the 1992 presidential election. For low sophistication Democrats, there was a greater likelihood of remembering negative information about the opposition party candidate. More sophisticated Democrats exhibited this pattern as well.

For less sophisticated Republicans, there were no partisan meaningful differences. More sophisticated Republicans were more likely to remember a negative Bush ad than a negative Clinton ad.

⁷In this case, the mean value is the proportion of all respondents claiming such a recollection.

If we look down the columns and simply compare the amount of negative recollections across levels of political sophistication, the only meaningful difference occurs among Republicans and their memories of negative Bush ads. Here, more sophisticated Republicans were much more likely to express a negative recollection of a Bush campaign ad than their less sophisticated Republican counterparts. This is what we would expect to find if political experts were more proficient at processing inconsistent information.

The distribution of positive memories of Bush ads is shown in Table 4 below. Looking across the row for partisan differences, we find that these occur only among less sophisticated citizens. Specifically, less sophisticated Democrats and less sophisticated Republicans are more likely to remember a positive Bush ad than a positive Clinton ad.

Table 4. Positive Ad Recollections (first recall only), 1992

		Positive Bush	Positive Clinton	
Democrats	low sophistication	.04	.02	$t = 2.50$
	(N = 865)	(.19)	(.15)	
	high sophistication	.06	.04	$t = 1.16$
	(N = 341)	(.23)	(.18)	
		$t = -1.29$	$t = -1.75$	
Republicans	low sophistication	.05	.02	$t = 3.00$
	(N = 569)	(.21)	(.12)	
	high sophistication	.06	.04	$t = 1.23$
	(N = 327)	(.23)	(.18)	
		$t = -0.62$	$t = -1.82$	

Source: 1992 National Election Study

Note: Cell entries are mean valence of candidate recollections. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. T-statistics are calculated across rows to measure partisan differences in mean recollections and down columns to measure differences in recollections as a function of political sophistication.

If we look down the columns for differences in the amount of positive recollections across levels of political sophistication, we see that for both Democrats and Republicans, more sophisticated voters tended to remember more positive information about Clinton than about Bush. Overall, the pattern of positive responses does not appear to be what we predicted. However, if we take into consideration the notion that Bush was the incumbent in 1992 and Clinton was the challenger, it makes more sense that less sophisticated citizens would remember more positive things about the incumbent regardless of their political party and more sophisticated citizens would have more memories about the challenger. Memories about an incumbent are generally more accessible, and incumbents tend to run more positive ad campaigns.

The distribution of negative ad recollections in the 1996 presidential campaign is shown in Table 5 below. In this case, Clinton is the Democratic incumbent and Dole is the Republican challenger.

Here, the response pattern is not quite what we predicted. Among less sophisticated Democrats, there were no significant partisan differences in negative information mentioned

in the first ad recollection. For sophisticated Democrats, negative recollections about Dole outnumbered negative recollections about Clinton. Among Republicans, less sophisticated voters were more likely to recall a negative ad by their party's candidate.

Table 5. Negative Ad Recollections (first recall only), 1996

		Negative Dole	Negative Clinton	
Democrats	low sophistication	.12	.06	$t = 1.31$
	(N = 626)	(.33)	(.23)	
	high sophistication	.19	.06	$t = 4.96$
	(N = 310)	(.39)	(.24)	
		$t = -2.66$	$t = 0.00$	
Republicans	low sophistication	.13	.07	$t = 2.68$
	(N = 374)	(.34)	(.25)	
	high sophistication	.14	.11	$t = 1.10$
	(N = 278)	(.34)	(.31)	
		$t = -0.38$	$t = -1.71$	

Source: 1996 National Election Study

Note: Cell entries are mean valence of candidate recollections. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. T-statistics are calculated across rows to measure partisan differences in mean recollections and down columns to measure differences in recollections as a function of political sophistication.

If we look down the columns at differences in the amount of negative ads remembered across levels of political sophistication, we find that more sophisticated Democrats tended to have more negative Dole recollections than did less sophisticated Democrats. And, more sophisticated Republicans remembered more negative Dole ads than less sophisticated Republicans as well. It appears that negative Dole ads were more salient for most voters, perhaps because there were many more negative Dole ads than there were negative Clinton ads. While challengers are generally expected to be more negative in their ad campaign than incumbents, this pattern was not evident in 1992. It may simply be the case that Dole ran a particularly negative campaign, leading to many more negative memories among voters.

The distribution of positive ad recollections in 1996 is shown in Table 6 below. For positive recollections about campaign advertisements, there are very few statistically significant differences of any kind. For Democrats, less sophisticated citizens remembered more positive things about Clinton ads than they did about Dole ads. Sophisticated Democrats exhibited no meaningful partisan differences across candidates.

For Republican citizens, there were no meaningful partisan differences in positive ad recollection for either level of political sophistication. However, if we look down the columns at differences in the amount of positive recollections across levels of sophistication, the one meaningful difference is in the direction that we expected. That is, more sophisticated Republicans tended to recall more positive things about Clinton ads than did less sophisticated Republicans. Again, this demonstrates a somewhat greater ability on the part of sophisticated citizens to process inconsistent information.

Table 6. Positive Ad Recollections (first recall only), 1996

		Positive Dole	Positive Clinton	
Democrats	low sophistication	.03	.06	$t = -2.54$
	(N = 626)	(.16)	(.24)	
	high sophistication	.04	.06	$t = -1.16$
	(N = 310)	(.20)	(.23)	
		$t = 0.88$	$t = 0.00$	
Republicans	low sophistication	.05	.03	$t = 1.46$
	(N = 374)	(.21)	(.18)	
	high sophistication	.05	.06	$t = -0.51$
	(N = 278)	(.22)	(.23)	
		$t = 0.00$	$t = -1.73$	

Source: 1996 National Election Study

Note: Cell entries are mean valence of candidate recollections. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. T-statistics are calculated across rows to measure partisan differences in mean recollections and down columns to measure differences in recollections as a function of political sophistication.

Effects of Political Ads on Candidate Evaluations

The expectation was that candidate evaluations would be primarily partisan in nature for more sophisticated citizens. For less sophisticated citizens, memories of political campaign ads were expected to exert some influence on assessments of the candidates. To test this hypothesis, the effect of partisanship and advertisement memory was used to predict general candidate feeling thermometer ratings as well as a host of candidate personality assessments.

Valence and feeling thermometer ratings. To test the proposition that the valence of the advertisement recalled is related to candidate evaluations, a series of variables was regressed on candidate feeling thermometer evaluations in each year:

$$\text{Bush} = \text{party id} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Bush} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Bush} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Clinton} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Clinton} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Clinton} = \text{party id} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Bush} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Bush} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Clinton} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Clinton} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Dole} = \text{party id} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Dole} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Dole} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Clinton} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Clinton} \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Clinton} = \text{party id} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Dole} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Dole} + \text{positive}^* \text{ Clinton} + \text{negative}^* \text{ Clinton} \quad (4)$$

Each equation was estimated twice: once for citizens with higher levels of education and once for citizens with lower levels of education. Equations 1 and 2 were used to evaluate the 1992 presidential elections, and equations 3 and 4 were used to evaluate the 1996 presidential elections. The results are shown in Tables 7.1-7.2 and 8.1-8.2, respectively..

As the results suggest, the valence of the political ad recalled by the respondent (if any) had very different effects on the candidates. For Clinton, the valence of ad recollections had little effect on feeling thermometer ratings. In both 1992 and 1996, party identification was the only variable that consistently attained statistical significance. Regardless of the respondent's level of political sophistication, assessments of Clinton were highly partisan in nature. This fits well with our predictions in that most citizens were expected to be strongly influenced by

partisan orientations. Sophisticated citizens were expected to be more strongly influenced by partisanship, and this is reflected in the higher R^2 value for this group.

In 1992, more sophisticated respondents also tended to feel warmer about Clinton if they could recall a positive advertisement (either in terms of their feelings about the ad, or in terms of content). While this does not support our expectations, it does not disconfirm them, either. Rahn et al. (1995) claim that sophisticated citizens tend to form judgments early in the campaign and then rationalize specific reasons for their decision (such as candidate likes and dislikes) to create apparent consistency. In this case, it is not clear whether positive ad recollections were used to derive a positive evaluation or if they merely served to rationalize it.

Among Republican candidates, the factors influencing feeling thermometer ratings were more diverse. In 1992, partisanship was still a major influence on evaluations for respondents at both levels of sophistication. However, among both groups citizens, the recollection of a positive Clinton ad served to lower Bush's feeling thermometer ratings.

In 1996, the picture was somewhat more muddled for the Republican candidate. The intercepts for the two groups were vastly different, there was a high amount of variability in the dependent variable, and overall, R^2 values tended to be very low. These all serve to make predictions more difficult. Among less sophisticated citizens, the party identification variable was not statistically significant. Instead, voters seemed to be lashing out at Dole for any ad perceived to be negative. A negative recollection of either a Dole ad or a Clinton ad led to substantially lower feeling thermometer ratings of Dole. Overall, the variance explained for this equation was very low (but the F-test was statistically significant). This suggests that, as expected, the partisan filter was weaker for less sophisticated citizens and overall candidate evaluations were "derived" from negative memories.

For more sophisticated voters in 1996, feeling thermometer ratings of Dole appear to be guided strictly by partisanship. This is what we should find if partisanship is a strong factor in formulating candidate evaluations.

Valence and evaluation of candidate characteristics. The problem with feeling thermometer ratings is that they are summary judgments of affect toward a candidate, and do not provide much detail about voter reactions to candidate personality characteristics. For this reason, we want to examine the effects of positive and negative ad recollections on personality traits.

The equations here are similar to the ones used in the preceding section, but in this case, the dependent variable was a specific candidate personality characteristic rather than an overall feeling thermometer rating. The results are reported in Table 9.1 and 9.2.

Citizen evaluations of candidate personality traits in 1992 were much more revealing about the types of cues voters used to formulate assessments. Since citizens were asked to gauge a particular aspect of the candidate's personality, rather than an overall affective assessment (which is more likely to be a reflection of vote choice).

The results reported in Table 9.1 fit very well with theoretical expectations. In 1992, more sophisticated citizens were guided strongly by partisanship in gauging every aspect of the candidates' personalities. In only one case did an ad memory contribute to a personality

assessment among more sophisticated voters. Less sophisticated citizens were guided by partisanship, but also by their memories of campaign ads. Positive ads tended to correspond with more positive assessments. In three instances with Bush and four instances with Clinton, a positive ad memory led to positive assessments of candidate personality traits. Negative memories tended to correspond with more negative assessments. In six of the seven instances where negative memories were significant (all of ads run by Bush), Bush was harmed or Clinton was helped.

Interestingly, positive memories tended to be more frequent than negative ones in judging candidate qualities in 1992. And, citizens generally relied on a candidate's own ad to evaluate him, rather than bringing in memories from an ad run by the opponent.

In 1996, the situation was somewhat different, perhaps due to the high levels of negative Dole ads remembered by voters of both political parties. Partisanship was again statistically significant for all citizens and across both candidates. For assessments of Dole's personality, less sophisticated citizens were more likely than sophisticated citizens to be influenced by memories of campaign ads (four instances compared to one instance), as was expected. However, there was a more muddled pattern to the relationship. In one instance, a negative recollection of a Dole ad hurt Dole, and in one instance, a positive recollection of a Dole ad hurt Dole. In two cases, negative memories of a Clinton ad helped Dole. Generally speaking, negative ads led to harm and positive ads helped, but not in every case.

Among assessments of Clinton character traits, memories again played a greater role for less sophisticated citizens (who accounted for five of the eight equations in which these variables attained statistical significance), as was predicted. And, as with evaluations of Dole's personality, the patterns are less clear than they were in 1992. Overall, Clinton was harmed more by negative ads in 1996 than he was in 1992, where they had virtually no effect. And, in two related instances among less sophisticated citizens (knowledge and intelligence traits), negative memories of Dole ads, positive memories of Dole ads, and negative Clinton ads all served to help Clinton. Voters may have been punishing Dole for a campaign perceived to be overly negative and rewarding Clinton for responding to negative attacks. This makes some sense because in all other instances of negative memories of ads run by Clinton, the effect was in the opposite direction.

If we examine the variance explained for each of these equations, we find an interesting pattern as well. That is, more than half of the time, the decision making strategies used by less sophisticated citizens tended to predict about as much of the variation in perceptions of candidate traits as did the more partisan (and presumably more efficient) strategies used by more sophisticated citizens. This is particularly evident in 1996. This fits well with our original expectations—the partisan filter was an overall better predictor for more sophisticated citizens, but when we take into account the types of cues less sophisticated citizens are likely to utilize (such as memories of campaign ads), their attitudes are just as predictable.

CONCLUSIONS

Negative advertising is on the rise. A survey of campaign ads run in 1988 and 1990 found that negative ads have become much more prevalent than positive ones (Hagstrom and Guskind 1992). Yet, few studies of negative advertisements have tended to focus on their demobilizing effects on the electorate. There are a small number of studies that have

examined the effects of negative advertisements on affective assessments of the candidates who run them, but their findings are not always consistent with the results reported here.

For example, experimental research has suggested that negative advertisements reduce positive attitudes toward both candidates (Basil, Schooler, and Reeves 1991). Strictly speaking, this does not appear to be the case. In most cases, ad memories are strongly shaped by partisan attitudes and thus exert no substantial independent effects. In those instances where memories of negative ads do matter, the effects seem to vary according to the candidate. In particular, incumbents seem to be harmed more by running negative ads and challengers seem to be unaffected. We did not find any evidence to support the theory that negative ads by one candidate reduced affect toward both candidates.

Ansola-behere et al. (1994) find that negative advertisements lower evaluations of the target candidate but have no effect on the source candidate's evaluations. And, in a later study, Ansola-behere et al. (1995) suggest that Republicans benefit more from negative ads and Democrats benefit more from positive ads. Again, the data here do not support these results. Bush suffered from running negative ads and benefitted from running positive ones in 1992. Clinton suffered no adverse effects from running negative ads in 1992, while he did benefit from positive ones. In 1992, the picture changed. Memories of negative ads harmed Dole and they harmed Clinton. If there is any pattern regarding citizens' reactions to negative ads, it is that they are not desirable if a candidate is an incumbent officeholder.

There is also little evidence to support the claim that positive ads are more strongly related to affect for candidates in a presidential race (Ansola-behere et al. 1995). Positive ads led to positive affect much more in 1992 than in 1996.

Overall, the findings reported here provide support for theories about differences in information processing strategies as a function of voters' levels of political sophistication. Specifically, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that less sophisticated citizens tend to recall events that fit well with their partisan orientation, while more sophisticated citizens are capable of recalling more inconsistent information. Additionally, while candidate assessments tend to be heavily influenced by a citizen's party identification, citizens do rely on different cues depending on their level of sophistication. For more sophisticated citizens, partisanship exerts a stronger effect, which is consistent with theories of on-line information processing. For less sophisticated citizens, positive and negative memories are more likely to be a supplementary source of information, as should be the case if they tend to use memory-based processing strategies.

And, just as important, while citizens may utilize different types of information in formulating candidate evaluations, it is not necessarily the case that sophisticated citizens have attitudes that are more predictable. Past research has focused on cues most likely to be used by sophisticated citizens, and has often concluded with the observation that sophisticated citizens have higher amounts of attitudinal or behavioral variance explained by such models. Such reasoning, however, is circular. If we focus on the types of decision making strategies used by less sophisticated voters, their political attitudes are as predictable and as understandable as those voters that we tend to view as political "experts."

Appendix. Coding Rules for Campaign Ad Master Codes

Ad recollections were coded as dummy variables where respondents were assigned a value of one for making the response and zero for not making the response. Below are the coding rules for ad recollection characteristics, based on the responses present in the frequency distributions for these survey questions (meaning, coding rules are only shown for responses actually given, and not the entire master code list).

A. 1992

1. negative: 10-15; 17; 30-31; 33; 35; 37; 49; 51; 53; 55; 57; 70-71; 75; 89; 132; 135-136; 144; 152-153
2. positive: 12; 16; 18; 32; 36; 38; 48; 52; 54; 56; 58; 68; 72; 74; 76; 78; 88; 134; 137-143; 154-160; 174-176
3. Bush: 30-38; 48-49; 130-149
4. Clinton: 51-68; 150-169

B. 1996

1. negative: 11; 13; 15; 17; 19; 29; 31; 33; 35; 37; 40; 53; 55; 75; 140-148; 171-179; 302; 402; 505; 520; 526
2. positive: 16; 36; 56; 132-136; 152-163; 170; 183-186; 502; 521; 525
3. Dole: 31-40; 130-149; 520-526
4. Clinton: 53-56; 150-179; 502-506

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Table 7.1. Valence and Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Clinton in 1992

Independent variable	Low Sophistication	High Sophistication
Party Identification	-6.88* (0.25)	-7.32* (0.34)
Negative recall of Bush ad	1.35 (1.73)	0.42 (2.30)
Positive recall of Bush ad	-1.17 (2.67)	-0.18 (3.41)
Negative recall of Clinton ad	2.59 (2.50)	-1.07 (3.81)
Positive recall of Clinton ad	3.98 (3.54)	8.51* (4.03)
Intercept	75.26	74.18
Adjusted R ²	.32	.38
N	1599	726

Source: 1992 National Election Study

**prob* ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

Table 7.2. Valence and Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Bush in 1992

Independent variable	Low Sophistication	High Sophistication
Party Identification	6.63* (0.28)	7.98* (0.38)
Negative recall of Bush ad	-2.30 (1.94)	3.81 (3.75)
Positive recall of Bush ad	4.47 (2.94)	-3.99 (2.52)
Negative recall of Clinton ad	-3.29 (2.81)	-4.32 (4.19)
Positive recall of Clinton ad	-7.87* (3.98)	-7.67* (4.42)
Intercept	35.68	28.77
Adjusted R ²	.26	.38
N	1638	726

Source: 1992 National Election Study

**prob* ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

Table 8.1. Valence and Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Clinton in 1996

Independent variable	Low Sophistication	High Sophistication
Party Identification	-8.58* (1.18)	-10.21* (0.77)
Negative recall of Dole ad	1.96 (7.83)	-2.11 (4.69)
Positive recall of Dole ad	-3.26 (14.06)	-6.48 (8.24)
Negative recall of Clinton ad	6.00 (10.56)	-7.56 (6.33)
Positive recall of Clinton ad	-1.56 (11.79)	-0.25 (7.24)
Intercept	90.21	88.89
Adjusted R ²	.05	.22
N	1084	625

Source: 1996 National Election Study

**prob* ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

Table 8.2. Valence and Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Dole in 1996

Independent variable	Low Sophistication	High Sophistication
Party Identification	3.41 (2.29)	6.24* (1.04)
Negative recall of Dole ad	-39.05* (15.13)	-0.06 (11.06)
Positive recall of Dole ad	-39.61 (27.17)	-7.02 (6.30)
Negative recall of Clinton ad	-34.92* (20.40)	-3.12 (8.50)
Positive recall of Clinton ad	-4.63 (22.77)	-3.87 (9.72)
Intercept	78.58	39.38
Adjusted R ²	.01	.05
N	1084	625

Source: 1996 National Election Study

**prob* ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

Table 9.1. Candidate Characteristics and Valence, 1992

Dependent variable		Party	Negative: Bush	Positive: Bush	Negative: Clinton	Positive: Clinton	Intercept	Adjusted R ²	N
Bush: Intelligence	low	-0.10*	0.01	-0.20*	-0.01	0.01	2.27	.07	1671
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)			
	high	-0.11*	-0.01	-0.12	0.02	-0.16	2.26	.09	725
Bush: compass'n	low	-0.15*	0.07	-0.12	0.11	0.10	2.71	.14	1607
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)			
	high	-0.18*	0.04	0.03	0.10	0.20	2.88	.21	718
Bush: moral	low	-0.10*	-0.03	-0.21*	0.09	-0.07	2.25	.07	1598
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)			
	high	-0.15*	0.06	-0.12	0.04	-0.02	2.42	.16	718
Bush: inspiring	low	-0.14*	0.17*	-0.05	0.10	0.04	2.96	.12	1604
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)			
	high	-0.17*	-0.07	-0.09	-0.15	0.20	3.32	.19	721
Bush: leader	low	-0.15*	0.10	-0.20*	-0.03	-0.03	2.75	.13	1630
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)			
	high	-0.16*	-0.05	-0.08	-0.26*	0.09	2.97	.18	722
Bush: cares	low	-0.22*	0.12*	-0.12	0.11	0.06	3.39	.22	1616
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.14)			
	high	-0.25*	-0.06	-0.02	-0.07	0.03	3.57	.34	716
Bush: knowledge	low	-0.09*	0.01	-0.14	-0.01	-0.19	2.23	.07	1622
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)			
	high	-0.10*	-0.06	-0.08	-0.21*	-0.17	2.30	.10	723
Bush: honest	low	-0.15*	0.02	-0.10	0.15	0.11	2.77	.12	1599
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)			
	high	-0.21*	0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.11	2.92	.25	717
Bush: things done	low	-0.14*	0.18*	-0.09	0.06	0.14	2.99	.13	1619
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)			
	high	-0.12*	0.03	0.02	-0.12	0.07	3.00	.12	718
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)			

-continued on next page-

Table 9.1, Continued.

Dependent variable	Party	Negative: Bush	Positive: Bush	Negative: Clinton	Positive: Clinton	Intercept	Adjusted R ²	N	
Clinton: intelligence	low	0.08*	-0.11*	-0.06	-0.05	-0.20*	1.73	.07	1538
	education	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)			
	high	0.06*	-0.08	-0.09	-0.16	-0.06	1.73	.04	713
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)			
Clinton: compass'n	low	0.11*	0.00	-0.17*	-0.03	-0.27*	1.81	.12	1481
	education	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)			
	high	0.07*	-0.10	-0.04	0.04	-0.19	1.90	.06	675
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)			
Clinton: moral	low	0.14*	0.07	0.14	0.05	-0.35*	2.14	.13	1478
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)			
	high	0.13*	-0.02	0.17	0.02	-0.12	2.37	.12	693
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)			
Clinton: inspiring	low	0.17*	-0.07	-0.13	-0.16*	-0.20	1.89	.18	1535
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)			
	high	0.13*	-0.10	0.04	-0.02	-0.34*	2.14	.11	711
	education	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)			
Clinton: leader	low	0.17*	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.34*	1.83	.21	1447
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)			
	high	0.16*	-0.04	0.10	-0.03	-0.15	1.97	.22	663
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)			
Clinton: cares	low	0.17*	-0.03	-0.11	-0.03	-0.19	1.78	.17	1484
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)			
	high	0.18*	-0.10	0.08	-0.03	-0.52*	1.88	.22	691
	education	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)			
Clinton: knowledge	low	0.09*	-0.11*	-0.01	0.07	-0.18*	1.77	.08	1541
	education	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)			
	high	0.10*	-0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.20	1.74	.11	708
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)			
Clinton: honest	low	0.16*	0.12*	0.04	0.04	-0.09	2.02	.15	1455
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)			
	high	0.16*	0.02	0.24*	0.04	-0.21	2.19	.20	672
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)			
Clinton: things done	low	0.14*	-0.11*	0.09	-0.03	-0.12	1.91	.15	1304
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)			
	high	0.13*	-0.12	0.18	0.07	-0.17	1.94	.16	599
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)			

Source: 1992 National Election Study

**prob* ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors

Table 9.2 Candidate Characteristics and Valence, 1996

Dependent variable		Party	Negative: Dole	Positive: Dole	Negative: Clinton	Positive: Clinton	Intercept	Adjusted R ²	N
Dole: moral	low	-0.11*	-0.11	-0.04	-0.14	-0.06	2.40	.09	1001
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)			
Dole: inspiring	high	-0.11*	-0.04	-0.11	-0.04	-0.05	2.22	.12	612
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Dole: leader	low	-0.14*	0.11	0.04	0.14	0.17	3.03	.14	1024
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Dole: cares	high	-0.13*	-0.01	-0.31*	0.05	-0.22*	3.18	.13	619
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.13)			
Dole: knowledge	low	-0.12*	0.11	0.21*	-0.03	0.15	2.65	.11	1006
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Dole: honest	high	-0.09*	0.03	-0.15	-0.12	-0.13	2.58	.07	613
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)			
Dole: things done	low	-0.18*	0.13*	0.02	0.00	0.11	3.15	.21	1013
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Dole: things done	high	-0.17*	0.09	-0.12	-0.03	0.06	3.09	.22	611
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.12)			
Dole: things done	low	-0.08*	-0.05	0.05	-0.16*	0.14	2.22	.07	1026
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)			
Dole: things done	high	-0.07*	-0.07	-0.09	-0.13	0.06	2.15	.06	621
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)			
Dole: things done	low	-0.12*	-0.02	-0.05	-0.08	0.14	2.58	.10	998
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Dole: things done	high	-0.11*	0.10	-0.18	-0.05	0.02	2.38	.11	609
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)			
Dole: things done	low	-0.11*	0.06	0.06	-0.21*	0.13	2.67	.10	978
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.10)			
Dole: things done	high	-0.08*	0.04	-0.07	-0.13	0.00	2.44	.08	601
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)			

-continued on next page-

Table 9.2, Continued.

Dependent variable	Party	Negative: Dole	Positive: Dole	Negative: Clinton	Positive: Clinton	Intercept	Adjusted R ²	N	
Clinton: intelligence	low	0.10*	-0.20*	-0.20*	-0.18*	-0.08	1.58	.08	1073
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.10)			
Clinton: compass'n	high	0.08*	0.02	-0.23*	0.12	0.02	1.45	.07	623
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: moral	low	0.21*	-0.04	-0.30*	-0.01	-0.05	1.68	.25	1053
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)			
Clinton: inspiring	high	0.19*	-0.17*	-0.06	0.02	-0.04	1.70	.27	621
	education	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)			
Clinton: leader	low	0.22*	0.06	0.04	0.15	-0.10	2.11	.26	1055
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: cares	high	0.22*	0.01	0.05	0.18*	-0.02	2.31	.34	617
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: knowledge	low	0.20*	-0.02	-0.10	0.08	-0.16	1.93	.22	1061
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: honest	high	0.19*	-0.03	-0.12	0.16	-0.12	2.02	.23	624
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.13)			
Clinton: things done	low	0.22*	-0.06	-0.02	0.16*	-0.13	1.74	.27	1068
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)			
Clinton: things done	high	0.21*	0.02	0.16	0.07	-0.17	1.85	.31	624
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)			
Clinton: things done	low	0.24*	-0.07	-0.21	-0.02	-0.09	1.79	.29	1064
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: things done	high	0.24*	-0.04	-0.17	0.04	-0.08	1.80	.35	621
	education	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)			
Clinton: things done	low	0.13*	-0.17*	-0.23*	-0.16*	-0.18*	1.61	.15	1069
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.10)			
Clinton: things done	high	0.10*	-0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.20	1.74	.11	708
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)			
Clinton: things done	low	0.23*	-0.02	-0.18	0.16*	-0.08	2.02	.29	1059
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: things done	high	0.24*	-0.01	-0.02	0.12	-0.04	2.21	.38	619
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			
Clinton: things done	low	0.16*	0.03	-0.10	-0.01	-0.09	1.94	.19	1070
	education	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.110)			
Clinton: things done	high	0.16*	0.01	0.11	-0.03	-0.17	2.04	.22	620
	education	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)			

Source: 1996 National Election Study

**prob* ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors